But if we form our judgment on the basis of the fetus' "potential", then why not consider the fetus' potential for future evils, as well? Why not take the view that you are snuffing out a potential murderer or a potential child molester? As yet, we have no infallible calculus that tells us which...
Well, thus far the only reason that you have identified for us to conclude that a fetus is not human is that it lacks certain features that it finally acquires around eight months. Perhaps I'm not looking hard enough, but I have yet to find anywhere in this discussion where you have nominated...
First of all, the very idea of the Trinity is that there is one God in three persons. To find a passage that distinguishes between actions and roles of the different persons in no way contradicts the Trinitarian proposition, because if there really are three persons, then we would expect to find...
Okay, let's examine your three propositions:
(1) Memory is perception of time and consciousness.
(2) If there is no afterlife, then we go from nothing to nothing, there would be no memory so there would be no perception of time.
(3) Therefore, our memories must be preserved in some way...
Except that no mentally capable adult seriously believes in the Tooth Fairy or Father Christmas, whereas many mentally capable adults profess a belief in God. Of course, you may, as Professor Dawkins does, insist that they are not mentally capable precisely because they believe in God, but this...
The problem with this argument, though, -- the reason why it will convince no one who opposes abortion on the grounds that it is murder -- is that it is circular. It presupposes that a "right to life" is alienable when it is consequentially convenient to do so. Essentially, to a pro-life...
I am a Calvinistic, Orthodox Presbyterian Christian.
What this *does not* mean is that I follow John Calvin (actually, I like Luther's writings better) or that I think that those who disagree with Calvinism aren't Christians (this is a Hyper-Calvinist teaching) or that I subscribe to...
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